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abstract This article reconstructs and analyzes a debate on “the crisis of liberalism” that
took place in a prominent philosophy journal, the Revue de me´taphysique et de morale, in
1902–3. The debate was actuated by combiste anticlerical measures and the apparently liberal
demand made by Catholics for freedom of instruction. Participants—all hostile to the
church—sought to articulate a principled, rationalist liberalism that could respond to the
needs of the republic in the post-Dreyfus era. Participants—including Ce´lestin Bougle´,
Dominique Parodi, Gustave Lanson, Elie Hale´vy, and Paul Lapie—balanced each in their
own way the demands of rationalism, democracy, and modernity. The debate opens a win-
dow onto the transition between the Second Empire’s dissident, neo-Kantian, liberal republi-
canism and the antitotalitarian liberalism that Hale´vy and his student Raymond Aron would
articulate in the interwar years.
keywords liberalism, republicanism, anticlericalism, philosophy, fin de sie`cle
“The Republic recognizes all liberties,” wrote Ferdinand Buisson in 1902,“except that of voluntary servitude.”1 The problem of a freedom that abdi-
cates itself has long been central to the politics of liberty, which is to say liberal-
ism, and Buisson’s formulation finds echoes from Etienne de La Boe´tie through
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The servitude he had in mind was the result of moral
and intellectual domination by the Catholic Church; laı¨que education overseen
by the republic was, in contrast, supposed to be the foundation of true freedom.
Buisson was among the great architects and administrators of the French school
system and demonstrated profound faith in its mission. For him, as for republi-
cans more broadly, freedom was not only a metaphysical fact and a political
right but also a moral duty on the part of the individual. However, the implica-
tions of the growing capacity of the state to “organize enthusiasm”—as Elie
1. Quoted in Ozouf, L’e´cole, l’e´glise, 179. All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are mine.
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Hale´vy would put it in another context decades later—troubled some younger
academics, themselves also professionally involved in elite pedagogy.2 In the
period of uncertainty just before the 1905 law gave definitive shape to the rela-
tionship between church and state, these philosophers worried that, perhaps,
enforced laı¨cite´ was not much better than enforced Catholicism. The Revue de
me´taphysique et de morale (hereafter Rmm), the premier philosophy journal of
the time, printed a debate on the topic, titled “The Crisis of Liberalism,” initi-
ated by a young professor working in Toulouse, Ce´lestin Bougle´.3 The discussion
that took place in 1902–3 was over principles, so no decision was called for.
Despite important differences in framing, and in evaluation of the forces at play
on the social and political fields, there was broad agreement. One response, in
the Jesuit periodical Etudes, summarized the result of the debate with some jus-
tice: “The true cure for the crisis, or the desirable endpoint of the evolution of
liberalism, is a monopoly over the universities.”4
This article begins with some simple questions. In the wide-ranging discus-
sion initiated by Bougle´’s essay, what was liberalism taken to mean? Over what
terms, principles, or facts did the debate take place? Why was there a perception of
crisis at this particular moment? In answering these questions through careful
contextualization of this specific intellectual encounter, I suggest that we must
revise accepted ideas about the contours of French fin de sie`cle liberalism, as well
as the trajectory of liberalism in France across the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. I treat the entrants into this debate as a group and examine the debate itself,
rather than pursuing one or several of these thinkers in isolation. This approach
might be styled the study of disagreement, or perhaps a microhistorical approach
to intellectual history.5 It draws on insights from the sociology of knowledge and
history of philosophy but rests on the cultural history of the period. Pinning
down particular opinions at particular moments is a crucial step in the process,
but the goal is to find the patterns and limits of a debate.
Divisions among this group sprang less from conceptual issues, although
these could be significant, than from what we might call matters of judgment.
How much did the republic really have to fear from the Catholic Church? A mir-
ror of this question was their relative fear of the state—to what degree could this
organ of generality as such itself become irrational? Was this possibility an
2. Hale´vy used the term in a talk, “L’e`re des tyrannies,” given to the Socie´te´ Franc¸aise de Philosophie
on November 28, 1936. Hale´vy, L’e`re des tyrannies, 214.
3. Four responses were collected in one issue, those of Gustave Lanson, Paul Lapie, Dominique Pa-
rodi, and George Lyon. The next year saw an additional essay from Baptiste Jacob, followed by another from
Parodi and something like a closing comment from The´odore Ruyssen. The essays appeared under the
“Practical Questions” rubric, which Hale´vy managed.
4. Sortais, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 578.
5. See the perceptive introduction by Prochasson and Rasmussen, “Du bon usage de la dispute,” in
“Comment on se dispute: Les formes de la controverse,” the 2007 issue of Mil neuf cent.
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essential or an incidental danger? The question was not abstract, because in 1902
the machinery of the state was actively engaged in persecuting—as Hale´vy, for
instance, was willing to call it in private correspondence—the Catholic teaching
orders in particular. But for the philosophers of the Rmm, this acute political
question raised conceptual and moral ones: What was the compelling force of
reason? Was there not a moral duty to pursue intellectual development?
Three related arguments run through this article, which are here presented
in increasing order of abstractness. First, the liberalism of these scholars
required, on a political, historical, and even conceptual level, the figure of the
antiliberal Catholic Church. The negative example, this is to say, of a church not
so far away from the Syllabus of Errors and the declaration of papal infallibility,
assured these philosophers of their own liberalism. Second, the terms in which
participants in this debate understood the relationship between the state and
intellectual activity were analogous to their understanding of the relationship
between the state and economic activity. The market for goods and services
required, to function justly, intervention on the part of the state; in the same
way, the state had an obligation to stage the competition between ideas in a cer-
tain way, for instance, by exercising some ideological control over the universi-
ties. Third, despite attempts to escape or mitigate it, a framework of dualistic
rationalism dominated the thinking of these philosophers on social and political
questions. This dualism took different forms, but the persistent division of the
ideal from the material, and the association of freedom with the former and
unfreedom with the latter, was especially important.
This article seeks to balance chronology, thematic presentation, and
respect for the integrity of the original arguments. To this end, I begin by indi-
cating implications of my own arguments for contemporary historiography. I
then briefly situate the Rmm in intellectual and political context. Before I turn
to Bougle´, a quick look at three figures, Ernest Renan, Jules Barni, and Henry
Michel, specifies limits within which liberalism might be claimed and the prob-
lems that did, or did not, seem to call it into question. I then examine Bougle´’s
essay, highlighting both the issues that will be taken up by others in the ensuing
debate and those that will be passed over in significant silence. Following this, I
provide synoptic accounts of a selection of the most important contributions,
drawing out major themes and points of disagreement. Last, I consider the
immediate reaction of Hale´vy to the debate—which, in his capacity as editor of
the Rmm, he had managed.
Historiography
That the revival in the historiography of French liberalism has not focused on
the first years of the twentieth century is perhaps reason enough to take a hard
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look at self-conscious discussions of liberalism in this period. Pierre Rosanvallon
and other scholars have argued persuasively that a major transformation in
French republicanism took place in the final decades of the nineteenth century.6
The individual-state model—supposedly dominant from the eighteenth century
through the Jacobin tradition—was softened to admit the importance of medi-
ating institutions. Another way of putting this is that republicans had by the end
of the century come to articulate their idea of liberty through sociology. We see,
however, powerful evidence here that many elite philosophers were committed
to a rationalist liberalism and resolutely refused to rest their principles on the
morphology of society. There can be, for these philosophers, really only one
institution mediating between individuals and reason: the university. It is
attached to the state and participates in its authority, but it is also autonomous
by virtue of its reason.
This debate presents a transitional moment in the history of French liber-
alism. It allows us to see continuities between the “aristocratic” liberalism of
Alexis de Tocqueville, the Kantianism of Charles Renouvier or Jules Barni, and
the antitotalitarian liberalism first of Hale´vy and then of his student Raymond
Aron.7 Essential to this transition are both the long-standing dualistic rational-
ism of the Rmm and the particular conjuncture of the years before 1905. Indeed,
this debate and his place in it are evidence for the importance of Hale´vy, who
was radical both in his commitment to rationalism as a moral position and in
his willingness to take a stand in history for this rationalism. We here see Hale´vy
on the way to the situational and antitotalitarian liberalism for which he and
Aron would be best known. As Jean-Fabien Spitz has argued at length, a number
of intellectuals around 1900 sought to put the state at the service of the moral
and intellectual development of the individual.8 For Spitz, this is a quintessen-
tially republican moment, but it was also, especially for some of those commit-
ted to rationalist and dualist morality at the top of the university system, a
moment of promise and danger for liberalism.
Pierre Macherry has recently suggested that in the nineteenth century all
French philosophy essentially concerned the republic—as real, imagined, possi-
ble, impossible, hallucinatory.9 Yet the historiography of philosophy has not
been well integrated into the broader history of the Third Republic. Exemplary
6. Rosanvallon, Demands of Liberty. See also Logue, From Philosophy to Sociology; and Brooks, Eclec-
tic Legacy. Also relevant is Spitz, Le moment re´publicain. See the contributions of Logue, “‘Sociological Turn’
in French Liberal Thought,” and Spitz, “‘Illiberalism’ of French Liberalism.”
7. Kahan, Aristocratic Liberalism. On Aron, see Hacohen, “‘The Strange Fact That the State of Israel
Exists’”; and Mu¨ller, “Fear and Freedom.”
8. Spitz, Le moment re´publicain.
9. Macherry, Etudes de philosophie “franc¸aise,” 39.
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work on the earlier nineteenth century such as Jan Goldstein’s does not, gener-
ally, find an analogue until the interwar period examined by scholars such as
Samuel Moyn or Stefanos Geroulanos.10 There is room for a more productive
dialogue between history and the history of philosophy.
The Rmm in Context
The Rmm was nearly ten years old when it printed Bougle´’s “Crisis of Liberal-
ism” in 1902 and had by this time established its position as a major representa-
tive of French philosophy. Two features defined the early 1890s: on the one
hand, the reconciliation of Catholics with the republic—the ralliement—and,
on the other, a new focus on the social question. We might say that as anticleri-
calism was muted, socialism asserted itself more loudly.11 At this moment, in
1893, a tightly knit group of friends launched the Rmm. This journal, firmly
identified from the beginning with a certain intellectual elite, would practice a
liberalism of the mind and, eventually, mobilize intellect to defend the repub-
lic.12 The´odule Ribot, the editor of the long-established Revue philosophique,
referred unhappily, although not incorrectly, to his new competitors as “young
people, rich, Jewish, and very metaphysical.”13 The journal was for professional
philosophers or, more properly, for philosophy as a vocation. Its editors—
principally Xavier Le´on and Elie Hale´vy—sought to be, in Hale´vy’s well-known
phrase, “rationalistes avec rage.”14 As befitted their ambition to revive philoso-
phy as a critical rationalism, the editorial policy was to be ecumenical rather
than eclectic.15 The Rmm had no declared political program, but its editors were
to the left of most of the profession. Early in the journal’s existence, for instance,
a provocative intervention by the editors’ former lyce´e professor Alphonse Darlu
10. Geroulanos, Atheism That Is Not Humanist; Goldstein, Post-revolutionary Self; Moyn, Origins of
the Other. See, however, Revill, “Emile Boutroux”; and, although its orientation is somewhat different, Sur-
kis, Sexing the Citizen.
11. On this framing, see Lebovics, Alliance of Iron and Wheat; Silverman, Art Nouveau; Mayeur, La
vie politique; Mayeur and Rebe´rioux, Third Republic; and Sorlin, Waldeck-Rousseau.
12. Soulie´, Les philosophes en Re´publique. See also Prochasson, “Philosopher au XXe sie`cle”; for an
account that places the Rmm at the beginning of a long tradition of French e´pistemologie, see the first chap-
ters of Revill’s dissertation, “Taking France to the School of the Sciences.”
13. Quoted in Merllie´, “Les rapports entre la Revue de metaphysique et la Revue philosophique,”
77–78. At least in the early planning stages, the review was understood as, in Xavier Le´on’s words, “an anti-
Ribotian and Renouvierist philosophical journal.” Le´on, Hale´vy, and Simon-Nahum, “Xavier Le´on/Elie
Hale´vy,” 16.
14. Le´on, Hale´vy, and Simon-Nahum, “Xavier Le´on/Elie Hale´vy,” 12. The phrase is perhaps best
translated as “impassioned rationalists.”
15. The terms are suggested by Ste´phan Soulie´. In practice, this means that although the directors of
the Rmm and their closest associates were quite hostile to the divergent approaches to philosophy repre-
sented by Emile Durkheim and Henri Bergson, the Rmm became a venue for both. See Soulie´, Les philosophes
en Re´publique, 68.
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on the desirability of an estate tax obliged the journal to switch publishers.16
Nonconforming socialists such as Fre´de´ric Rauh and Charles Andler represented
the left wing of the Rmm’s associates, and quite radical opinions could be aired
“among philosophers” without difficulty.17
Defending the autonomy of philosophy as a discipline against both posi-
tivist materialism and theological or spiritualist irrationalism, the journal
sought to take philosophy to “the school of the sciences,” to return to the
ancient problems of philosophy with new energy, and finally to engage with the
present world. Just as neo-Kantian philosophy of science had to be improved on
in light of scientific developments, so too the political thought of republican
neo-Kantians such as Barni and Renouvier required new elaboration when faced
with the problems of a mature republican France at the dawn of the twentieth
century. But it is important to recognize that this program fit into a broader
reaction against the positivism of the previous decade. Something similar is visi-
ble in other fields, as Debora Silverman has shown, for instance, with regard to
the transformation of visual and plastic arts after 1889.18 As Ribot’s unhappiness
with the new journal suggests, its particular brand of republicanism did not
immediately appeal to all parties. Indeed, the group would continue in later
years to spar over the relation of science to philosophy—and the political con-
clusions to draw from this—with republicans of a more positivist orientation,
Emile Durkheim in particular. If, for several years, the search for a nonrevolu-
tionary solution to the social question could dominate mainstream political dis-
cussion, in 1897–98 the Dreyfus affair remade the politicocultural context.
The affair is usually seen as the essential factor in the turn to politics of the
Rmm cohort. Certainly it provoked a new round of conflict over issues of
national belonging, religious identity, and republican freedoms. I do not wish to
minimize the disturbance—even trauma—that such an eruption of antisemi-
tism precipitated for this social group. It was made up in large measure of people
who may at most be called highly assimilated Jews, who experienced the affair in
part as the imposition of a new identity.19 A few points, however, are worth
16. See ibid.
17. As Rauh put it more than once during debate at the Socie´te´ Franc¸aise de Philosophie. See Michel,
“La doctrine politique de la de´mocratie,” 113.
18. Silverman, Art Nouveau.
19. Joel Revill and others have argued for the importance of the sudden imposition of Jewishness on
some of these deeply assimilated individuals, people for whom it may well be inappropriate, from a histori-
cal perspective, to speak of Jewishness at all. Hale´vy, expressing in late 1897 his certainty that an injustice had
been committed, writes to Bougle´, “I have a jewish name, and I am protestant: am I deceived by my caste
[victime d’une illusion de caste]?” Hale´vy, Correspondance, 203. A good introduction is Julliard, “Elie Hale´vy,
le te´moin engage´.” The literature on French Jews and Jewishness in this period is vast. One relevant and use-
ful recent work is Joskowicz, Modernity of Others. See Revill, “Taking France to the School of the Sciences”;
and Revill, “‘Bitterness of Disappointed Expectations.’” The most substantial recent work on Hale´vy is
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emphasizing. First, students of Darlu’s could hardly have failed to relate philoso-
phy to life from the beginning of their studies. Indeed, Le´on Brunschvicg—
unofficial cofounder of the Rmm, who would exercise enormous influence,
especially after the First World War—and Hale´vy were hashing out their own
positions about political issues around the freedom of association and education
even before creating the Rmm.20 The “practical questions” rubric under which
the “crisis of liberalism” would eventually be discussed itself dated from 1895,
before the extraordinary mobilization of the Dreyfus affair. So the latter was by
no means the beginning of reflection for these individuals on religion, freedom,
and education. Nor was it the end. If the antirepublican forces marshaled
around the guilt of Dreyfus proved how much work remained, they did not
provoke a crisis in the concept of liberalism.
Rather, the Rmm’s “crisis of liberalism” was provoked by the political shift
from republican defense to offense. After a period of serious ministerial instabil-
ity and public unrest, in 1899 Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau formed a government of
republican defense. He acted with some vigor suppressing the most outspoken
opponents of the republican form of government. In July 1901 a law on associa-
tions created a new legal framework for the regulation of the various religious
orders. As Maurice Agulhon has written, legislators cut the “Gordian knot” pre-
sented by “the republican need to complete the array of fundamental freedoms
by granting the right of association, and the no less republican mistrust with
regard to possible subversive groups . . . by preparing a frankly discriminatory
law.”21 Freedom of association was granted, but religious associations had to
Frobert, Elie Hale´vy. A stimulating conference on Hale´vy, organized by K. Steven Vincent, came at an impor-
tant moment in my work on this subject. Several papers given at this conference have since been published,
but they appeared too late for me to materially engage with them here. See Duclert, “‘Elie Hale´vy Retrouve´’”;
Conti and Welch, “Receptions of Elie Hale´vy’s La Formation”; Frobert, “Elie Hale´vy and Philosophical
Radicalism”; Revill, “Practical Turn”; Vincent, “Elie Hale´vy on England and the English”; and Vincent,
“Forum.”
20. Hale´vy’s long response to Brunschvicg’s 1891 me´moire on Spinoza raises some of these issues.
Brunschvicg wrote to Hale´vy in 1892, continuing a longer discussion on the topic, about differences between
the two over the question of church-state separation, anticlericalism, and freedom of education. Both the
vocabulary and self-positioning are of interest: “I ask for separation to give the church dignity and liberty,
and for your part you add that this separation cannot be made except with a law annihilating associations,
which makes my ‘liberalism’ (oh! me liberal!) contradictory.” Later on in the same letter, on education: “The
question is whether moral oversight [tutelle morale] belongs to the father, or the state. Liberals say the father:
me, I say to the state. . . . It is nonetheless the case that education is a tyranny: must it be suppressed? . . . You
think in principle that the state can only be either clerical or anticlerical.” For the Spinoza response, see Insti-
tut de Me´moire d’Edition Contemporain (IMEC), fonds Brunschvicg, correspondance divers. For the letter,
see IMEC fonds Brunschvicg, BCR 01-02, BCR 01-03 H47, Feb. 11, 1892.
21. Agulhon, French Republic, 99. As Chloe´ Gaboriaux has shown, the law did not institute the sort
of associations that republicans had most ardently desired, precisely because this would have allowed reli-
gious congregations to function with too great latitude. The law was, as she writes, “faute de mieux” and all
the more suspect for this. Gaboriaux, “La loi 1901.”
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apply for special authorization. If, for Waldeck-Rousseau, this was to have been
the first step in a new “concordat of congregations,”22 new elections in 1902 con-
vinced him to step aside in favor of a radical, Emile Combes, who applied the
provisions of the new law with rigor, denying en bloc applications for official
status. He closed twelve thousand religious-run schools. Many republicans were
appalled by Combes’s heavy-handed measures. However, the parliamentary
elections of April–May 1902 were among the hardest-fought and best-attended
elections of the era, and they seemed a mandate for Combes’s anticlerical poli-
cies.23 In this charged context, Bougle´ formulated his concerns and initiated
debate over the status of liberalism. The 1905 law of separation, which would
substantially change the terms of debate, was yet to come, and the form it would
ultimately take could hardly have been predicted.
Judicial misconduct and antisemitic violence did not provoke this crisis of
liberalism. Neither of them presented any conceptual challenge to a liberal
worldview. It was, rather, the spectacle of schoolhouses shut because of who
taught there, even more than what was taught, and the very real prospect of
a state monopoly over higher education that provoked and sustained self-
reflection on the part of these descendants of the “hussards noirs” of the repub-
lic. So although the Dreyfus affair was undeniably a formative event, we must
look to its suites as well. The affair itself presented (at least as far as the Dreyfu-
sards were concerned) a relatively clear-cut question of justice or injustice. But
as the initial political danger receded and staunch republicans regained control
of the situation, new questions arose that could not be so easily answered. Mys-
tique gave way to politique. An appeal to reason, to justice, to law, to truth was
an effective answer to an illegal imprisonment but offered little guidance as a
positive political program.
Bougle´’s intervention fit very well with the spirit of the Rmm and pro-
voked responses from other frequent contributors, including Dominique Pa-
rodi, Baptiste Jacob, and Paul Lapie, as well as Gustave Lanson, a literary histo-
rian relatively removed from this group. We can also follow, at least partly
through his correspondence, Hale´vy’s response. These men would all have
regarded themselves as liberal in the sense of undogmatic and tolerant of diver-
gent opinion. All vigorously defended the actually existing Third Republic, of
which most, although not all, were agents as educators. What they faced in 1902
was a philosophical and moral challenge of just the sort that their critical ratio-
nalism demanded they meet. How could their politics, broadly construed, be
justified without deviating from their principles?
22. Cited in Mayeur, La vie politique, 184.
23. See Mayeur and Rebe´rioux, Third Republic, 220. See also Mayeur, La vie politique, 188; and
Mayeur, La se´paration de l’Eglise et de l’Etat.
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Liberalism as a term was worth arguing over in part because it was capa-
cious. It indicated a mode of sociability as well as of intellectual engagement.
But it also named a political position—even if, as Parodi lamented,
“names . . . no longer express anything on their own. . . . It does not seem that
the progressistes are always the most impatient for progress, or the liberals the
most passionate about liberty”—and so was a standing challenge: could the ide-
als and strictures of l’esprit also be those of the republic?24 When it came to
action in the contemporary world, these philosophers were committed both to
the universality and to the moral content of reason. But if reason was both pub-
lic and moral, how could one maintain, as Darlu had written, “the distinction
between the political order and the moral order” that is “the principle of liberal-
ism”?25 No clear and distinct compelling solution was put forward.
Renan, Barni, and Michel
We can appreciate the limits of liberalism as a name in this period better by
looking at two antecedents for the Rmm cohort and one contemporary: first, the
idealist liberalism Ernest Renan claimed late in his life; second, Jules Barni’s
democratic and neo-Kantian republicanism; and finally the individualism artic-
ulated as a contemporary political philosophy by Henry Michel. These three
suggest not only relevant intellectual coordinates for the Rmm’s debate over the
term liberalism but also the dilemmas inherited from past discussions, particu-
larly the political ambiguity of rationalism.
It was Renan, perhaps more than any other master thinker of the early
Third Republic, against whom the Rmm group drew its position. Despite his
political ambiguity, Renan remained a symbolically and intellectually important
figure in the epic contest of science against the irrational for laı¨que republi-
cans.26 In 1890, near the end of his life, in a preface to the publication of his
early manuscript L’avenir de la science, Renan articulated a vision of intellectual
24. Parodi, “L’ide´e et le fait en politique,” 246.
25. Darlu, writing in 1898, was involved in a dispute with Charles Andler over Le´on Bourgeois’s Soli-
darisme. Darlu, “Encore quelques re´flexions,” 117. Darlu’s original review sounds strikingly modern notes: he
manages to object to Bourgeois’s idea of solidarisme from the perspective of class distinctions (it is precisely
the solidarity of worker and boss that generates hatred and fear between them), gender roles (how can politi-
cal solidarity be a universal law when more than half the people in France are excluded from it because they
are women?), and even the racial-imperial order (which justifies violence against the supposedly inferior
races in faraway countries). Darlu, “La solidarite´.” Jean Elisabeth Pedersen has recently explored discussions
both of empire and of relations between the sexes that took place in different venues and that involved many
of the figures appearing in the present article. See Pedersen, “‘Speaking Together Openly, Honestly and Pro-
foundly’”; and Pedersen, “Alsace-Lorraine and Africa.”
26. Agulhon has highlighted the distance between the reputation Renan earned with the antirepublican
Reforme intellectuelle et morale and his eventual adhesion to the Third Republic: Agulhon, “Ernest Renan.”
For a different perspective on Renan’s cultural significance, see Priest, “Reading, Writing, and Religion.”
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liberalism. The founders of the Rmm endorsed both Renan’s self-conscious ide-
alism and his valorization of science as a spiritually charged project. They might
have agreed with him that “for us idealists, one doctrine only is true, the tran-
scendent doctrine according to which the goal of humanity is the constitution
of a superior consciousness.”27 They could not follow him, however, in his
frankly aesthetic and elitist approach to this scientific idealism. For Renan, poli-
tics in democracy was incapable of direction or meaning. Liberalism allowed
excellence to flourish, and this could be its only justification. It implied, how-
ever, that most humans would simply be the caput mortuum necessary to pro-
duce the sublime odor, the raw material required for the delicate and rare fruit.
Democratic as the world unfortunately was, Renan wrote, this truth could not
be openly avowed. Renan’s liberalism had to be an esoteric one. The Rmm
group, in contrast, was not simply resigned to democracy as a cultural as well as
a political form. They believed passionately in a popular and engaged form of
politics, although how this might look, especially in the wake of the Dreyfus
affair, was up for discussion. Their liberalism believed itself to be democratic,
universalist, egalitarian, constitutively exoteric.
The more democratic position of Barni, recently dubbed “idealist republi-
canism” by Sudhir Hazareesingh, was attractive but also no longer adequate.28
Barni had been an influential republican dissident during the Second Empire
and would have been known to readers of the Rmm, if only as French translator
of Kant’s major works. Barni’s idea of the democratic state as one that would
allow the development of all equally as personalities was a powerful inspiration
to these younger men. But Barni, looking at the capacity of the Bonapartist state
to intervene successfully in civil society, had been wary of state involvement in
the economy or in other spheres. He was perfectly willing to accept autonomous
worker’s organizations but was hostile to the idea of state involvement in welfare
distribution. Further, Barni unequivocally favored allowing plural educational
establishments. “True democracy,” he wrote, “is not afraid of liberty.” Specifically
addressing the danger of clerical education, he maintained that “a good public
education” would, through competition, be “the best way of avoiding this dan-
ger.”29 Among the transformations that took place in the earlier 1890s was the
broad acceptance of a significantly greater role for the state in the economy than
Barni thought wise. In the wake of the Dreyfus affair and the apparently existen-
tial ideological conflicts it exposed, precisely this faith in the power of open
political competition to bring harmony would be difficult to maintain.
27. Renan, L’avenir de la science, xvi.
28. Hazareesingh, Intellectual Founders of the Republic.
29. Barni, La morale dans la de´mocratie, 164.
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Perhaps the most articulate and vigorous defender of a restored neo-Kant-
ian liberalism among the Rmm’s cohort was Michel, who worked at the inter-
section of the history of political ideas and political philosophy.30 In June 1901
the Socie´te´ Franc¸aise de Philosophie—a professional organization closely associ-
ated with the Rmm—met to discuss Michel’s attempt to define democracy. For
Michel, democracy was both a liberalism, because it aimed at freedom, and a
socialism, because it implied a certain interventionism in the economy.
Michel defended claims he had developed at length in his monumental
1896 study of the history of French political ideas, L’ide´e de l’Etat. Drawing on
the writings of Renouvier—like Barni a neo-Kantian—Michel sought to ground
his political ideals in a fundamental metaphysical orientation. At the origin of
all systematic thought, according to Michel, was a stark choice. “One must
choose, and one must dare to choose,” between a philosophy of necessity and
materialism, or one of freedom and idealism.31 These, Renouvier showed us,
present a fundamental alternative with no third term possible. But the very fact
of this choice is an argument in favor of idealism, a philosophy of freedom.
Once this choice is made, the ends of politics are essentially settled—only the
means remain to be discussed.
Michel’s account of democracy rested on an appealing idea of justice,
which he summarized in two fundamental rights possessed by every person:
“The right to live, with [the right] to raise oneself through culture.”32 He put the
personality as a dynamic moral fact at the center of political thought. In expli-
cating Rousseau’s social contract, Michel expressed his own ideas: “The state
must be strong not for itself . . . but for the individual.”33 Michel spells out the
dilemma that nonetheless remains as he recapitulates and defends Renouvier’s
final position: “If it is for all persons to arrive at certainty freely themselves, spir-
itual agreement [l’accord des esprits] in this work of liberty can be realized only
through a severe discipline of thought, through a rigorous application of the
principle of contradiction. That alone guarantees both the success of individual
efforts and the desirable convergence of their results.”34 This Kantian linking of
both morality and reason to freedom is reminiscent of Henri de Saint-Simon’s
or other early socialist notions of harmony.
The 1901 discussion of Michel’s ideas raised two fundamental objections:
first about the status of the economy, and second about Michel’s remarkable
30. Michel himself has been much neglected. But see Spitz, Le moment re´publicain. Serge Audier has
sought to bring Michel back to attention. See the 2005 volume of Corpus, devoted to Michel, particularly
Audier, “Pre´sentation.”
31. Michel, L’ide´e de l’Etat, 638. On Renouvier, see Blais, Au principe de la Re´publique.
32. Michel, L’ide´e de l’Etat, 646.
33. Ibid., 83.
34. Ibid., 622.
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faith in the ultimate convergence of interests. Rauh in particular challenged
Michel’s reluctance to speak about economic matters, trying unsuccessfully to
elicit from Michel a principled statement to the effect that private property was
in itself antidemocratic. For Michel, the economy is a realm of pure means.
From this it follows that private property has only historical or empirical value.
It is in itself neither antidemocratic nor democratic.35 This was related to a
more apparently metaphysical question. For Michel, since reason is unified,
autonomous humans will tend in the direction of harmony—at least once the
dross of the material, economic world has been removed. Directly challenged on
the question of innate egoism by Andre´ Lalande, Michel responded, “Once the
chains are removed . . . will not order among wills [volonte´s] establish itself
spontaneously?”36 The material world is one of conflict and violence; the ideal
realm is one of harmony and logic.
This position, however, only highlights the importance of the autonomous
will, able to choose for itself. Autonomy is the condition compatible with both
reason and a morality of freedom. This freedom in reason must be chosen, but
the choice is not itself an act of reason:
The history of ideas . . . reduces the propositions [the`ses] among which it is pos-
sible to choose to a quite small number. . . . Choice among these few proposi-
tions will always be a choice with the full force of that term, a free selection that
must remain free. We suspend politics, like everything else, with a moral taking
of sides [un parti pris moral]. History enlightens us without determining us.37
For Michel, we progress from animal to human and eventually to pure will.
Morality, then, figured as denial of material determinants, is the last term of
political discussion. The essential political decision is a moral one. Michel’s
dualism has issued already in an appeal to ethical practice.
Discussion of Michel’s neo-Kantian arguments took place in terms of
democracy, not liberalism. Political context, not the inherent content of these
arguments, dictated this choice. The moment at which the Rmm did engage in a
debate over the foundations of liberalism suggests the stakes of this discussion
for the reading public that followed it. Debate was undertaken from a position
of power, not one of weakness. For Bougle´, just a few months after the Rmm
group had met with Michel, the political scene called into question less the val-
ues and language of democracy than those of liberalism.
35. Michel, “La doctrine politique de la de´mocratie,” 111–12.
36. According to the record, “M. RAUH does not approve.” Ibid., 121.
37. Ibid., 123–24.
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Bougle´’s “Crisis”
Bougle´’s “Crisis of Liberalism” was originally a public lecture given as part of
his engagement in the universite´s populaires and other post-Dreyfus public edu-
cation projects.38 It was therefore only part of a broader attempt to clarify posi-
tions and stakes in the great debates of the day. Yet the problems it raised were
central ones. Bougle´ began by specifying his object: not economic liberalism.
This, he wrote, was not undergoing a crisis. It was dead and buried. There was
no need to discuss it.39 Liberalism also indicated intellectual freedom. Indeed,
the Third Republic was remarkable in the freedom it allowed the press to, for
instance, print libelous information without legal consequence. Bougle´’s interest
lay in the merits of an “absolute intellectual liberalism” whose formula was “Let
speak, let think, let men enlighten one another.”40 Did such an absolutism make
sense any longer?
The conceptual foundation of this absolutism was, Bougle´ suggested, an
underlying faith in progress. Three recent events, he argued, made such a posi-
tion difficult to maintain. First, the anarchist attacks of the 1890s convinced
many that certain ideas should not be expressed at all, that perhaps it was not so
easy to tell where word transformed into deed. Freedom of expression had to
give way to obedience to law.41 Second, the Dreyfus affair, during which the role
of the press was similarly problematic, highlighted the practical importance of
philosophical differences that, it had previously been thought, could be tolerated
with no difficulty in a liberal society. In the aftermath of the affair Bougle´ wrote,
“We saw that these doctrinal divergences were of more significance than had
been believed.”42 Finally, the ongoing crisis around the role of the Catholic
Church indicated to many people that the unity necessary for any society to
38. Bougle´’s lecture was given in February 1902, and Bougle´ proposed the piece for the Rmm to
Hale´vy in early August. The responses to Bougle´ were finished by late November. Hale´vy, Correspondance,
324–29, repr. in Bougle´, Vie spirituelle, 39–70. Bougle´ was a student of Durkheim and a collaborator at the
Anne´e sociologique—as were other participants in this debate—but he was also close to Hale´vy and the Rmm.
Much can be said about the relations between Durkheim’s group and the Rmm, but it seems to me wrong to
frame this argument over liberalism as an argument between two tendencies represented by these two jour-
nals, so I do not emphasize this angle of investigation. See Barberis, “Moral Education for the Elite of
Democracy.”
39. Classical economic liberalism was still taught at the university, but it had more than a little must-
iness about it. The Me´line tariff reform of 1891 had signaled the acceptance of economic interventionism on
the part of even conservative elements within the French business classes. The later 1890s saw other major
reforms and innovations. For different approaches to this reformism, see Elwitt, Third Republic Defended;
Horne, Social Laboratory for Modern France; and Lebovics, Alliance of Iron and Wheat.
40. Bougle´, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 636.
41. Here Bougle´ may also have been thinking about the recent dismissal of Gustave Herve´ from his
post as schoolteacher for expressing antipatriotic opinions. Bougle´ had been disturbed by Herve´’s dismissal;
Hale´vy disagreed with him, accepting the right of the state to defend itself in such cases. Hale´vy, Correspon-
dance, 317–18.
42. Bougle´, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 644.
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function at all was threatened by the church as a “state within a state.”43 All of
this, Bougle´ says, has provoked a crisis among believers in “absolute liberalism”
by suggesting that the principles of liberalism—freedom of expression, of con-
science, of association—were coming into conflict with the minimal necessities
of a coherent and functional society.44 Intellectual liberalism might simply go
the way of economic liberalism.
It is worth pausing over Bougle´’s staging of the liberal individual and
interpersonal liberalism. We have all met men, he wrote, for whom “liberal feel-
ing has passed to an instinctual state.” Indeed, it can be “a pleasure, of a quite
particular kind and price, to chat in the most calm and friendly way with a man
who we know to be an intransigent adversary.” Liberalism here is an intimate
social pleasure. The pleasure is heightened by the knowledge that “a hundred
years ago, I would perhaps have sent you to the scaffold. How times have
changed!”45 More than a pleasure of intimate sociality, liberalism is friendship
carried on in the full consciousness of historical contingency. Friendship—so
important to the Rmm group, all great readers of Plato—is in fact an escape
from the material fatalism of history. Individual friendship is, in any case, imag-
ined here as the pure form of liberalism. In this staging of liberalism as an inter-
personal encounter within and against history, and in the broader concern that
liberalism as a political program might simply become obsolete—and this
through the collapse of the notion of progress itself—Bougle´ exhibits a strong
awareness of historical change driving transformations in value systems.
The central practical question was the degree of control and power to be
handed over to the state, particularly in educational matters. Citing Benjamin
Constant and Tocqueville but arriving finally at terms borrowed from his men-
tor, Durkheim, Bougle´ declared the existence of “a hypertrophic state over an
unorganized mass of individuals” to be “a veritable sociological monstrosity.”46
Mediating institutions are necessary to check the power of the state. Some such
institutions are more dangerous than the state itself. Still, to the socialists who
wanted to use the state to crush the church, if only so that socialism itself had
room to grow, Bougle´ warned, “Be on guard . . . lest the weapon you have forged
be turned against you,” and then considered “advanced parties” more generally,
asking if, “in hurrying to wall up the past in its tomb, they do not crush the
43. Ibid., 643–45.
44. For Bougle´, it is sociologically demonstrable that a society requires, to act in concert and there-
fore to exist as a society, a certain amount of obedience to a code of law, resemblance among its members,
and centralization of administration. Bougle´’s own work as a sociologist in this period tended in a formalist
direction. His Ide´es egalitaires, first published in 1899, signals this by supplementing Durkheim’s framework,
established in Division du travail, with the work of Georg Simmel. Bougle´ and Audier, Les ide´es e´galitaires.
45. Bougle´, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 637.
46. Ibid., 648–49.
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future in its cradle?”47 Few of the responses to Bougle´ demonstrated the same
concern about the power of the state to thwart salutary change, or the same
interest in mediating institutions.
Bougle´ offered no explicit solutions to this crisis. He ended by expressing
the perhaps modest hope that clearly articulating the trade-offs involved in cer-
tain state actions, as well as the values actually thereby defended, would raise the
level of public discourse and thus protect indirectly “the moeurs of a free coun-
try.”48 However, a practical conclusion is implied by the form he gives to the
real problem of state involvement in education. The great danger is less state
direction in itself than the threat that each successive “party in power” will
attempt the reconstitution of moral unity according to its own views and ten-
dencies by putting pressure on teachers. Implied here is the Durkheimian solu-
tion: the educational institutions of the republic should have their own auton-
omy as the guardians of public reason.49 Thus Bougle´’s hesitation over the idea
that the “monopole d’enseignement” will restore moral unity to France comes
not from the monopoly itself but from concern that it will be insufficiently iso-
lated from notoriously capricious and shallow representative government.
Bougle´ was distant from the Parisian center, teaching in Toulouse and com-
mitted not to academic philosophy but to the emerging discipline of sociology.
He was, perhaps for this reason, more willing than his interlocutors would be to
locate reason institutionally within the state. Still, for Bougle´ the institution tasked
with spiritual freedom as such—education most broadly construed—had to be
free to act according to its own principles but also safeguarded from illegitimate
competition by a rationally directed public power. It was absurd, this is to say,
that two institutions might both claim to represent reason in society. The terms
in which Bougle´ framed the question of liberalism thus retained the dualism
typical of French philosophy and left little room for a pluralist solution.
Reasoning Out the Crisis
Bougle´’s essay merited a clutch of responses, the first from Lanson. He lamented
recognizing himself among those Bougle´ designated as “authoritarians” and
47. Ibid., 650.
48. Ibid., 652.
49. In an important sense, this really was the direction that reform of the school systems took in
those years. Increased financial autonomy was an important aspect of the creation of universities in 1896, as
well as of the secondary school reform of 1902. This latter reform was perhaps more important for the debate
over liberalism than the former. The content of the lyce´e reforms may not have been transparent to contem-
poraries, but in retrospect it can be said that they represented the result of a debate internal to the ruling
classes and that they satisfied to some extent commercial interests, the requirements of class distinction, and
the anticlericals. See Isambert-Jamati, “Une re´forme des lyce´es et colle`ges”; Ringer, Fields of Knowledge; and
Weisz, Emergence of Modern Universities in France.
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insisted on his essential liberalism. Lanson claimed to offer only “the confession
of an elector trying to reason things out.” Even in this capacity, Lanson divides
the “liberal party” from a “speculative liberalism” that, while still a historical
entity, has a doctrinal and moral existence beyond any party.50
For Lanson, the advent of democracy changed the nature of the govern-
ment’s authority. For the democratic state to assert authority is
simply the legal organization of freedom, the definition by law and conservation
by government of national freedoms. Even here there is no contradiction
between liberal republic and authoritarian democracy: the one is the realization
of the other. To accept, for example, the authority of M. Waldeck-Rousseau is
not to recover, through a reactionary apostasy, the principle of Louis XIV or
Gregory VII.51
On this basis Lanson defended the capacity of the state not only to manage edu-
cation—although, as many seemed to think best, indirectly through control of
certification—but also to enforce a strong distinction in the realm of the printed
word between thought and action.52 This is because the state, as the organiza-
tion of liberty, is in a position to say when one individual’s freedom has become
another’s tyranny. Freedom of thought, Lanson wrote, indeed had to be
defended absolutely, and along with it freedom of expression—even democratic
authority could not trump these individual freedoms. But some expressions
were really actions. While any journalist should be free to write, “I wish some-
one would deliver us from this terrible government,” without fear of legal repri-
sal, a statement such as “Meet at Place de la Nation at 3 p.m., and bring your
revolver” or a lie about a specific individual “can make no claim on the freedom
of thought.”53 Highlighted here, in almost lawyerly fashion by this literary critic,
is a distinction between a realm of pure thought and one of action.
50. Lanson, “A propos de la ‘crise du libe´ralisme,’” 749.
51. Ibid., 751.
52. The loi Falloux, as The´odore Ruyssen reminded readers while arguing against a state monopoly,
gave the state broad powers to inspect nonstate schools. How bad could things really get, he maintained, if
such secondary schools were obliged to be staffed by people with university training and were more aggres-
sively inspected? Ruyssen, “Le monopole universitaire.”
53. Lanson, “A propos de la ‘crise du libe´ralisme,’” 752. Lanson, immediately having made this dis-
tinction, insists that it is always better to err on the side of freedom and let some of the guilty go free, that
the freedom of the press to attack politicians is crucial to democratic politics, and that the press should not,
as such, be held responsible; the state should not concern itself with the press as such, only with things done
through it. Ibid., 753. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty offers an adjudication of this question, in perhaps a more
open spirit, suggesting that even if tyrannicide has met with broad approval throughout history, “instigation
to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of punishment, but only if an overt act has followed” (Mill,
On Liberty, 20–21). Mill, although he had been the subject of Michel’s Latin thesis and must have been well
known to Hale´vy through his work on English radicalism, was rarely evoked in this debate. I would like to
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Lanson’s implicit distinction between a realm of the spirit and one of the
material—that is, of freedom and constraint—is evident in his discussion of
religion. Of course beliefs must be absolutely protected. Society has nothing to
object to in any kind of individual belief, “but,” Lanson says,
as soon as the exterior life of the believer is no longer the simple and direct
expression of his mystical activity—as soon as it develops beyond the properly
religious terrain into the domain of economic interests and social functions—
then, although the believer might well attach all these modes of activity to his
mystical activity and give them out as necessary prolongations of it, we are not
obliged to believe him.54
Religion is essentially a mystical relation between an individual and deity. Here
we see, perhaps, evidence of the long association of liberalism with Jansenism
and Protestantism.55 Although Lanson allows that some “prayer or ritual” may
“express this relation” and therefore deserve protection, such expressions seem
to him minimal and easily subtracted from real, material, society: “The organi-
zation of property, of teaching corporations, of aid societies, the conditions for
the recruitment of functionaries: all this has nothing at all to do with the ques-
tion of religious freedom.”56 For Lanson, religion is spiritual, and the spiritual
cannot legitimately impinge on the material except through the mediating func-
tions of science and universal suffrage. On this way of understanding religion,
Lanson went unchallenged. As Hale´vy had written to Bougle´, “The basis [fond]
of Catholicism is the idea of a state religion, of the unanimity of religious con-
sciences; the day Catholicism becomes a Protestant sect, I will believe in religious
liberalism.”57 The underlying dualistic rationalism of the group effectively ruled
Catholicism out of bounds on apparently philosophical rather than political
grounds.
Jacob’s intervention is perhaps the most acute articulation of Lanson’s
dilemma. Jacob made his name with an 1898 defense in the pages of the Rmm of
rationalism against Henri Bergson’s Matie`re et me´moire. Here too he defends a
rigorously rationalist liberalism.58 Jacob draws out the analogy with economic
liberalism. Like Bougle´, he is confident that the economic perspective of liberal-
ism is no longer that of free competition: “In the order of ideas as in the order
thank the anonymous reviewer who suggested Mill’s relevance, as well as Elizabeth Everton for suggesting
that this passage may refer to a specific event.
54. Lanson, “A propos de la ‘crise du libe´ralisme,’” 754.
55. See Welch, “Jansenism and Liberalism.”
56. Lanson, “A propos de la ‘crise du libe´ralisme,’” 755.
57. Hale´vy, Correspondance, 324 (Aug. 10, 1902).
58. On Jacob and this defense, see Soulie´, Les philosophes en Re´publique, 264–73.
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of interests, liberalism has ceased to be an apology for absolute laissez-
faire. . . . Rational pedagogical liberalism consists in establishing the conditions
for a just competition between ideas, as rational economic liberalism does in
establishing the conditions for a just competition between practical ambi-
tions.”59 Rational liberalism is therefore entirely comfortable, in theory, limit-
ing, but not suppressing, the freedom of action of those who would themselves
abolish the conditions of just competition in intellectual development as in eco-
nomic. What Jacob calls “rational liberalism” in the economic sphere might be
better described as solidarisme or even, depending on who is speaking, creeping
socialism.60 But for Jacob, since the goal is individual freedom, we are still
speaking of liberalism.
Rational liberalism, however, can only ever be an ideal—regulative, to be
sure, but never more than that. Jacob arrives at this position not simply through
political realism but through a basic metaphysical principle: “To realize the con-
ditions of true liberalism, it would be necessary—absurd hypothesis—to elimi-
nate the whole of the sensible and leave on the field only pure minds [esprits].”61
This is impossible because, following Aristotle, the intelligible is inseparable
from the sensible, and the sensible always contains something indeterminate
and irrational. So we have a regulative ideal of just competition, in economic as
well as spiritual matters, but one that recognizes what might be called the irre-
ducible contingency of the original situation: all competition actually takes
place in history, and the constitutive injustice of history viewed abstractly can-
not be eliminated. Rational liberalism is an impossible dream; empirical liberal-
ism, an endless battle.
Jacob’s framing is a particularly clear example of the patterns that this arti-
cle argues dominated this debate over liberalism. Even while attempting to miti-
gate the sharp dualism implied by his rationalism, he accepts an odd parallelism
between markets for commodities and for ideas. In both cases there are only
two terms: the individual and the general or the state. Just as Le´on Bourgeois’s
solidarisme was an ideological toolkit for explaining socioeconomic reform
without accepting the substantive existence of institutions mediating between—
or even constituting—the two extreme terms, so rational pedagogical liberalism
leaves room for discerning state involvement in education without admitting
the substantive existence of the church.
59. Jacob, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 102.
60. On solidarisme, see Audier, Le´on Bourgeois; Blais, La solidarite´; and Horne, Social Laboratory for
Modern France. Important in the present context, especially in foregrounding the question of dualism, is
Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory.
61. Jacob, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 106.
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In practice, however, metaphysics did not determine Jacob’s position on
the issue of liberte´ d’enseignement. The decisive factor was his belief that Catholi-
cism was a spent force. Bougle´ had been perturbed by the ability of Catholics
and monarchists to claim to stand for real liberty; Jacob concluded from this,
more optimistically, that “true Catholicism, logical Catholicism, is dead for-
ever.”62 Although the mechanism of change would not have satisfied his more
sociologically minded readers, Jacob asserted that “definitively, popular Catholic
sentiment has repudiated civil intolerance in religious matters. . . . Under the
action of modern thinking [la pense´e moderne] . . . the old intolerance is singu-
larly weakened.”63 The danger that a state monopoly on education would be per-
ceived as antiliberal, even though it accorded perfectly with rational liberalism,
was too great. Safe in the knowledge that its adversary was dying, the state
should avoid even the merely apparent tyranny of a monopoly in education.
Political or historical judgment, not principle, was immediately decisive.
Jacob’s metaphysical position was by no means universally shared, and if
its political consequences were not decisive, they did pull in the direction of less
state intervention. Lapie, in contrast, defended a less modest rationalism. A
cofounder of the Anne´e sociologique with Durkheim, Parodi, and Bougle´, Lapie
was very much a product of the republic’s meritocracy and would spend the last
part of his life in high administrative positions.64 In 1921 he would reaffirm his
antipluralism in the clearest possible way: “There is no conflict, bloody or ver-
bal, local or global, that does not have at its root an error or a misunderstand-
ing. . . . Correct action follows correct thought.”65 This same fighting faith is vis-
ible in his 1902 defense of liberalism. Lapie insisted that the law of the state, to
retain “its impersonality, that is to say its moral value,” must never be aimed at
individuals or specific classes of individuals.66 Only social functions can be the
legitimate objects of laws. It therefore makes no sense to target religious teach-
ers, teaching institutions, or religious associations. Laws of general application
would be entirely sufficient to protect what had to be protected from religious
influence. Without making any reference to religion, the state should simply
62. Ibid., 112.
63. Ibid., 113.
64. Lapie attended the Sorbonne on scholarship. He took up the rectorship at Toulouse in 1911, later
becoming the director of primary education. See Terral, “Paul Lapie.” His trajectory is in sharp contrast with
the inherited cultural and material capital of Le´on and Hale´vy, both of whom were in a position to pursue
whatever vocation they chose, no matter how little it paid.
65. Lapie, Pour la raison, iv. Hale´vy: “I do not blame Lapie for having said, like Plato, that [no one is
bad intentionally]; but his definition of justice . . . seems to me indefensible;—more exactly, it seems to me
that it should never be defended by anyone other than him.” Hale´vy, Correspondance, 322.
66. Lapie, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 768.
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oblige all teachers to complete a given course of study.67 The implication here is
that religion is not a social function. Inasmuch as it can be discussed at all, it is
purely individual and therefore outside the purview of the law. But, further,
Lapie implies that no Catholic of deep belief would be allowed—able—to pass
the relevant course of study.
Lapie, resting comfortably on his rationalism, is much more willing to use
the coercive power of the state than is Jacob. In what might be a direct response
to Lapie, Jacob worried that “to invite the state to paralyze the influences that
artificially favor conservative or reactionary ideas is to forget that the state can
itself by artifice attribute to certain ideas, old or new, an influence that does not
naturally belong to them.” Jacob is happy to admit that the “tyranny of social
and worldly prejudices is not a chimera, but neither is that of the state.” Perhaps
speaking again to Lapie, as well as to Lanson, Jacob says that many “are confused
on this point, because they imagine that in a democratic regime the opinion of
the state becomes one, through the intermediary of universal suffrage, with
common sense. Nothing could be farther from the truth.”68 For Jacob, although
he professes himself to be as attached as Lapie to a rationalist ideal, this ideal
can by its nature never be realized. The practical consequence of this position is
that Jacob will not trade—as Lapie will—liberal means for liberal ends. The
spirit of liberalism must be protected, especially given the increasing traction
found by demands for economic restructuring coming from the socialists,
demands with which Jacob, like most of the Rmm circle, was broadly sympa-
thetic. The best grand strategy, Jacob believes, is to let the church die the natural
death that is already, he is confident, on the horizon.69
Something like the last word in the Rmm’s discussion of the crisis of liber-
alism went to Parodi, who claimed to side firmly with Jacob’s distinction
between a rational and an empirical liberalism even as he took an effectively dif-
ferent position.70 If we regard a rationally constructed liberalism as a mere prin-
ciple of action, we must investigate it fully with the tools of philosophical analy-
sis: “Principles are, in the practical order and for the conduct of life, what
theories are in the speculative order and for the progress of the sciences.”71
These principles of course come into contact with messy reality. Looking to
Renouvier, Parodi explains that since “human action takes place in an unjust,
67. Ibid., 771–72.
68. Jacob, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 116.
69. Ibid., 120.
70. Parodi’s father was Italian, but he had success writing, among other things, verse in French. Parodi,
a firmly rationalist Dreyfusard, taught philosophy at various lyce´es, after the war becoming inspector general
of public education. He took over the direction of the Rmm after Hale´vy’s death. See Lalande, “Dominique
Parodi”; Soulie´, Les philosophes en Re´publique, 57n147; and Parodi, “Encore la crise du libe´ralisme,” 279.
71. Parodi, “Encore la crise du libe´ralisme,” 265–66.
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abnormal, and irrational milieu, reason cannot pretend to determine it entirely
[inte´gralement], under pain of working against itself” and, yet more strongly,
that human action “cannot conform to intransigent principles except at the
price of their eclipse, their more complete and durable violation in humanity as
a whole.”72 Parodi, then, is really pushing in a different direction from Jacob’s
cautious, methodological optimism. To save liberalism, Parodi asserts, its princi-
ples cannot be sacred. Rational liberalism is, in a sense, irrational.
This should not be confused with a twentieth-century antitotalitarian lib-
eralism. Parodi asks, “Can I act toward the invalid or the madman as with a
healthy man?,” and, more directly, “Is the best way to prepare the development
of reason in a child . . . in fact to address ourselves from the beginning and
exclusively to it [reason]?”73 The child—and, by extension, “the worker, the
peasant . . . the alcoholic or the son of an alcoholic”—does not yet possess
“rational autonomy,” and so it is reasonable for the pedagogue who seeks to
inculcate reason to draw on resources exogenous to it.74 In earlier writings for
the Rmm, Parodi had outlined a powerful moral defense of gradualist social
reform. Liberty and equality were, he argued, morality itself. To give something
like an equal chance at freedom to all was the only way to foster republican fra-
ternite´. Such reasoned freedom was not something that could be bestowed by
the rational state: “It is difficult for the state . . . to make reason rule in collective
relations, because no one infallibly knows how to find or how to obey it.”75 Free-
doms were felt to be real only when they had been won. Parodi’s individualist
rationalism put the development of the individual as person at the center of
morality and, for him, fit into a politics of gradualist reformism that made the
state the privileged terrain, if not the agent, of social action.
Whatever their metaphysical roots, the differences among Parodi, Jacob,
Lapie, and other participants in this debate amount to different evaluations of
the danger presented to liberalism by the church. Parodi himself is deeply pessi-
mistic, objecting strenuously to Jacob’s idea that Catholicism will die a natural
death. On the contrary, Catholicism is on the march: “Undeniable, constant,
menacing. The struggle is open. Great care must be shown in the choice of
weapons: it would be imprudent, perhaps naive, to disarm.”76 A secular
72. Ibid., 268.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., 277. Conspicuously missing from this list of not fully autonomous subjects is, of course,
women. The Rmm group as a whole had a bad conscience on the question, as demonstrated by Pedersen (see
n. 25). While theoretically committed to the equality of men and women, and in some cases actively involved
in campaigns for political equality, this group found itself unable to include women’s voices within public
discourse, never mind the actual practice of philosophy. In this bad conscience the Rmm mirrored the ideol-
ogy of the radical socialists. See Stone, Sons of the Revolution.
75. Parodi, “Liberte´ et e´galite´,” 391.
76. Parodi, “Encore la crise du libe´ralisme,” 276.
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worldview should have spread from the top of society downward, but something
like the reverse happened in France during the nineteenth century. “The people”
have steadily shed their religious beliefs, while the bourgeoisie has turned
increasingly toward the church, producing “an ever-deepening scission [scis-
sion] between two hostile Frances: it is to be feared that only violence can resolve
the conflicts that arise quietly between them.”77 Such, Parodi believes, is the
besieged situation of liberalism in France at the dawn of the twentieth century.
To the questions, what violence? and in whose favor? Parodi gives a clear
answer signaled, if nothing else, by repeated references to 1848. The violence
need not be bloody, but it might well be the forceful imposition of secular edu-
cation on the whole nation, carried out in the name of the people. Indeed, there
is a messianic imperative to educate—the lower classes, of course, but yet more
urgently the upper ones, who are the more at fault. The Second Republic was
lost by the too hasty ascription of rational autonomy to the people as a whole.
The republic was betrayed by workers and peasants not yet ready to be free. The
Third Republic must avoid this fate and so must insist on fashioning for itself a
free—that is, a republican—electorate. This indeed is where Parodi places his
bet, however hedged: “We perceive, at least in theory, and putting aside the
question of the right moment, only one clear and whole way of respecting the
principle of equal liberty for all: this is le monopole universitaire, but corrected,
or rather completed, by the greatest freedom for the teaching corps,” as well as
complete freedom of religious instruction outside school.78 Parodi’s solution,
then, like Bougle´’s, demanded autonomy for the teachers but unsurprisingly, to
those not reassured by such a possibility, reeked of creeping state monopoly.
Parodi wanted to extend the logic of the earlier campaign for state control of
primary education into the field of higher education. That he should regard this
as a fundamentally liberal program puts him sharply at odds with the remain-
ders of classical antistatist liberals in France, such as Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, who
continued to polemicize against state-led education.79
One might well ask where Parodi thinks he stands here: not among the
bourgeoisie, and clearly not among le peuple. Parodi, it seems clear enough,
understands himself as a sworn man for the republic—a functionary, an auto-
crat, for freedom. Unlike the pure rationalist Lapie, Parodi gives us a fully,
77. Ibid., 277. Hale´vy indeed also identifies the influence of Catholicism over the French bourgeoisie
as France’s most pressing problem. This is a rather self-serving and incorrect account of the progress of
Catholicism in France. As others noted even at the time, among the distinguishing features of the new cul-
ture of pilgrimages and Marianism were powerful popular involvement and bottom-up pressure on the
church hierarchy. See Clark and Kaiser, Culture Wars; and Harris, Lourdes.
78. Parodi, “La crise du libe´ralisme,” 781.
79. Or, indeed, state-led initiatives of any kind. But see esp. Leroy-Beaulieu, L’e´tat moderne et ses
fonctions, 331.
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remarkably, historicized world: “On the moving scene of our social life, condi-
tions of action are constantly changing, and perhaps the solution that seems to
impose itself today will no longer be possible tomorrow, if some irrevocable act
intervenes, some event that decisively engages us on a path from which we can
no longer exit: for such is the inevitable tyranny of social solidarity.”80 For Pa-
rodi, social action is a gambit that each person must undertake individually. Is
Jacob right that the church is in decline and that enforcing secular education
will only poison liberalism for the future? Or is the church really more powerful
than it might appear, and is it necessary to actively defend the freedoms already
won? In 1848 the wrong choice was made, and a generation or more was lost.
History condemned that choice. Perhaps one day a secular monopoly on teach-
ing will not be experienced as dogmatic or intolerant but will be understood as
all good liberals understand it now, that is, “as a social organization of intellec-
tual freedom.”81 This organization can take place only through the organ of the
general will, that is, the state. Appeal to reason covers over the potential contra-
diction between the requirements that the state enforce the singularity of this
organization and that teachers be autonomous.
Just as economic liberalism had dissolved into state action—for instance,
the breakup of monopolies—in support of the market, so the liberalism of the
mind would have to give way to the social organization of a truly free intellectual
field, in which competition would be managed carefully by the state. Parodi
together with Jacob explicitly justifies this freedom as a mechanism for creating
legitimate hierarchy. The goal of economic intervention was equality of oppor-
tunity, not leveling of outcome. The inevitable difference in outcomes could
then not be accused of injustice or exploitation. Those who succeeded would be
those more naturally talented, or those who applied their wills more resolutely.
The intervention of the state was supposed to clarify natural differences and
therefore to be moral, rather than immorally to eliminate difference. The same
logic applied in the intellectual sphere both to ideas and to individuals. Under
just conditions of competition, reason would emerge from error, just as individ-
uals would find their proper place in the social hierarchy.
But this was from the perspective of the whole, of the nation. For
individuals—once their rationality was beyond question—liberalism could be a
fighting faith, quite removed from any economistic discourse. Parodi in particu-
lar, then, defending liberalism, arrives at a Manichaean, scissionistic vision of
social reality that demands what might be called an existential commitment on
the part of individuals, to take coercive political steps now in the hopes of future
justification in the name of a utopian rationalist project. Not all the participants
80. Parodi, “Encore la crise du libe´ralisme,” 278.
81. Ibid., 279.
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in the discussion arrived at such an extreme vision of the world, but all of them
mobilized the same basic dualistic framework: reason and freedom in a realm of
the ideal; irrationality and constraint in the material world. None of them was
eager to entertain deeply pluralist possibilities, nor could they really escape—
even as they rejected—the competitive model of economic liberalism.
Hale´vy’s Republicanism
If anyone was in a position to think creatively and historically about liberalism
in France, it was Hale´vy, already in the midst of teaching and publishing on
English radicalism and the history of European socialism. We have heard at sev-
eral points from Hale´vy. His positions deserve more attention because in the
interwar he will emerge as the most intellectually serious and influential of the
lonely French liberals. Hale´vy did not contribute publicly to the debate except in
his capacity as editor of the Rmm’s rubric for “practical questions.” But he did
respond privately to Bougle´’s suggestion that he present his opinion. Hale´vy
agreed that, in thinking about liberalism, to begin with individual liberte´ is to
frame an impossible question. Liberalism, rather, “admits the necessity of a state
but recognizes that the state can become tyrannical in its turn.” Liberalism thus
takes as its task maintaining conditions under which the state is prevented from
becoming “tyrannical” but remains “effective.”82 Yet Hale´vy gives a distinctively
republican turn to this problem: “I believe that the state, in essence, is not tyran-
nical; it is, in essence, the defensive organ of society in general [la socie´te´ ge´ne´-
rale] against particular societies, of all individuals against all groups.”83 The gen-
eral—the universal?—resides in the whole and the individuals, while the
particular resides in groups that would interrupt the communion of individual
and whole. As Hale´vy put it in his study of English radicalism, echoing Michel’s
neo-Kantian republicanism, many difficulties fall away if one sees “the interven-
tions of the state as necessary not only to render individuals more happy but to
render them more free.”84
To be sure, the state is an imperfect tool and can be corrupted by falling
into the hands of particular groups. Moreover, as Hale´vy had written elsewhere,
the fundamental limit of state action to repair injustice is “our ignorance” of
particular cases, in the obscurity of which the situation is more likely to be wors-
ened than improved.85 But the fact that this danger exists should not cause us,
82. Hale´vy, Correspondance, 329.
83. Ibid. He would use quite similar language in the conclusion to Hale´vy, La formation du radica-
lisme philosophique, 3:375.
84. Hale´vy, La formation du radicalisme philosophique, 3:372.
85. Ibid., 3:357–58.
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Hale´vy wrote Bougle´, to “renounce the only means in our power to defend lib-
erty.” Hale´vy gives some precision to this thing that must be defended. “Liberty,
understood in the intellectual meaning of the word, as the use of reason, and
faith in reason: liberty as virtue . . . the philosophy of liberty demands that we
consider, a priori, all men as reasonable.” We are again on an unstable terrain
between concept and history. This Kantian invocation of reason and freedom is
immediately supplemented by a reference to the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen, according to which “one must tolerate all opinions, even reli-
gious ones.” But, like Lanson, Hale´vy draws the lines around opinion rather
tightly: “Priests, monks, mark themselves out for suspicion.”86 They cannot be
excused for their unreason. “They are, they intend to be, living symbols of
unreason.” After all, Hale´vy writes, with perhaps a little irony, “Do we not
owe it to them to take seriously their most solemn vows?”87 He concludes that
“there is a meaning of the words liberty and liberalism in which these words
are synonymous with state anticlericalism [d’anticle´ricalisme d’e´tat].”88 Religion
is bad particularity—an individual abdicating freedom to a group or another
individual—while liberty and reason are universals at the level of the whole and
the individual.
Hale´vy, too, at least in responding to the arguments set in motion by his
friend Bougle´, put his commitment to rationalism first. Commitment to ratio-
nalism, for Hale´vy, carried with it political consequences pulling against conser-
vatism.89 Liberalism would then be, at best, the recognition that the world will
not, ultimately, be rationally organized. Yet for Hale´vy, a true liberalism also
implied assigning to the state the task of holding people responsible for the ratio-
nality of their actions. But this was necessary only because, Hale´vy believed, the
republic was profoundly challenged by antirational authoritarianism, especially
stemming from the Catholic Church. Like Parodi, Hale´vy wagers that this threat is
real and therefore that the republic can legitimately pursue liberal ends with illib-
eral means. But this is not a question that can be resolved conceptually. Rational-
ism in the public sphere becomes a matter of will rather than of intellect.
Conclusion
In the political and institutional conflict between church and state at the end of
the nineteenth century, and in the efforts of the republican state to defend itself
86. Hale´vy, Correspondance, 329.
87. Ibid., 329–30.
88. Ibid., 330.
89. For instance, “There is no doubt a connection between the rationalism of the utilitarians and
their radicalism in politics.” Hale´vy, La formation du radicalisme philosophique, 3:348.
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through the educational establishment, Bougle´ recognized a crisis of liberalism
on a theoretical as well as a political level. He found it self-evident that an ade-
quate response demanded a thoroughgoing reappraisal of metaphysical founda-
tions and the relation of politics to these foundations. This reappraisal was, of
course, historically implicated with the Dreyfus affair. Nonetheless, for the Rmm
group liberalism was thrown into question neither by the occult, illegal, and
antisemitic machinations of the army nor by virulent resistance to revision of
the Dreyfus verdict. The affair as a whole was a formative experience, a catalyst
for politicization. It presented setbacks and problems, to be sure, but only deep-
ened the liberal faith. In contrast, use of the coercive power of the state to
enforce, rather even than to form, a condition of autonomous rationality chal-
lenged the liberal worldview of these philosophers on its own terms. This was a
crisis. Its political aspect was state action—violence, as Parodi explicitly called it.
The force of the general will had a right and even a duty to intervene to protect
reason in the world. The conceptual heart of the issue was a grappling with dual-
ism and the relation of metaphysics and the ethics of philosophical practice to
the active world.
Liberalism was indivisible from the republic—and this means the histori-
cally existing French Third Republic. The historical transformations of liberal-
ism were not to be ignored. These were the crises of a liberal party, and these
philosophers were all quick to assert that liberalism was not only a party but
also a spirit. It was to this concept or idea of intellectual liberalism, expressed
philosophically in an individualism articulated in terms borrowed from Kant by
way of Renouvier, that the Rmm tried to hew. The question of liberte´ d’enseigne-
ment was inseparable from the conflict of church and state. It also highlighted
divisions between republicans and liberals, as well as between the more intransi-
gent or workerist socialists and parliamentary socialists or radical republicans.
For philosophers in particular—who were of course not immune to the influ-
ence of the above ideological affiliations—it activated questions of will and intel-
lect, of freedom and moral responsibility, ultimately the moral content and uni-
versality of reason itself.
These philosophers used the language and logic of the economic realm to
think about intellectual liberalism. They specifically rejected the idea that liberal-
ism was only an economic project, but they immediately analogized from the
critique of free-market economic liberalism to a critique of an absolute intellec-
tual liberalism. A problematic tension subsisted, however, because these two
realms could not be parallel: the economic or social realm was managed to pro-
duce a just order, but the telos of the intellectual realm as articulated in society
was less clear. What differentiated the debaters was their confidence in the
capacity of the modern democratic state to be faithful to this poorly defined
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telos—not the ultimate desirability of such a public enforcement of rationality.
Public is significant because there is also a competing private model of liberal-
ism, which is interpersonal friendship and conversation. Here we see most
strongly the traces of an older tradition of aristocratic liberalism that is not easily
squared with the democratic presuppositions of all these philosophers.
The challenge these philosophers did not meet was to articulate a political
liberalism consonant with their rationalist universalism. The Rmm itself func-
tioned as an ideal and liberal republic. In its pages and in the social field around
it, reason could be plural without danger because faith in its unity brought
everyone together in the first place. The empirical Third Republic, warts and all,
could boast no such unifying purpose. In any event, political, as opposed to
merely interpersonal, liberalism was possible only with help from the antiliberal
church. Pluralism could be articulated temporally—the church had not yet
ceased to exist—without endangering the principle of rationality.
Liberalism was thus historically and empirically defined against the nonlib-
eralism of the clerical party. In this debate, at least, anticlericalism was essential
to the political and even conceptual justification of liberalism. The Catholic
Church, and the abiding refusal of its minions and their dupes to accept reason,
provided a sort of historical alibi for the embarrassment into which the Rmm’s
rationalist liberalism sometimes fell. Antisemitism and bigoted nationalism
were contained within cle´ricalisme.90 That was, and remained, the enemy. His-
torians have recently been more willing to see continuities in rhetoric, logic, and
even organization between the flourishing popular culture of Catholicism in the
later nineteenth century and the fascist movements of the twentieth century.91
The material examined here suggests that in the French case, at least, there is
continuity also between nineteenth-century anticlericalism and twentieth-cen-
tury antitotalitarianism.
Because the struggle between the forces of the church and those of the
republic was a historical one, its real outlines could not be reliably known.
Rationalists were thus called on to make a choice for a given policy under condi-
tions of uncertainty. Principles could not reliably authorize or condemn action.
Hale´vy wrote to Bougle´ in mid-1902, apropos of the law on associations, that “it
is . . . not for reasons of formal legality or justice that you condemn the law that
today attempts are made to apply, but because it is condemned to fail.”92 Liberal
rationalism, this is to say, resolved itself into an ethics of commitment to the
90. This would be Bougle´’s argument in lectures given over the next few years. Bougle´, Solidarisme
et libe´ralisme.
91. See esp. Clark, “New Catholicism.”
92. Hale´vy, Correspondance, 325 (Aug. 15, 1902).
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actually existing republic—here, too, the interpersonal model of the liberal
returns. Reason was held to be by nature individuating, to put the autonomous
individual at the center of moral judgment. Yet personal ethical commitment to
the republic was supposed to bridge the gap between universal and particular,
ideal and material, rational and historical. Will, a central philosophical category
for these readers of Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte, was essentially individual.
The transformation of individual will into collective will was always dangerous,
always a moment of potential irrationality. The republic, then, was the unstable
but necessary condition of liberalism.
This rationalist ethics was intimately connected to a thoroughgoing dual-
ism. These philosophers—“critical idealists”—placed themselves on the side of
Plato and Kant over and against a form of nonrationalism that they would vari-
ously describe as pantheism, mysticism, or pragmatism—indicating by this
Hegel and Marx but also, in a different way, Bergson and William James. For
Hale´vy as for Bougle´, to be liberal was to insist on the moral centrality of the
transcendental reality of reason. If Lapie is hopelessly vulgar, Hale´vy is no less
insistent that to compromise the differentiation of mind and matter is to com-
promise everything. Yet the individual, who must act, is the point at which mind
and matter connect. How to conceptualize institutions that could take action in
a way that did not undermine either reason (the general) or morality (the ratio-
nal freedom of the individual)? The liberal ideal was always a conversation, but
not one carried out in the smudged pages of the daily press or even in the Rmm.
It was, rather, as Bougle´ had imagined, a civilized conversation carried on face
to face between two individuals engaged with total freedom.
ERIC BRANDOM is visiting assistant professor at Kansas State University. He is work-
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Liberalism.
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